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THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND POWERS OF
APPOINTMENT
JOHN

MULFORD t

Frequently, property is given by a testator or by the settlor of a
trust to one person for life, with a power to name by appointment the
persons who are to, take the property after his death. What state has
jurisdiction over property subject to such a power of appointment, and
what law governs the creation and the exercise of such a power? The
two problems raised by these cases have been troubling the courts of
common-law countries for exactly one hundred years 1 since the situs
of the property and the domiciles of the donor of the power (i. e., the
settlor or the testator), the donee (i. e., the person, generally the life
tenant, who is to exercise the power), and the appointee often do not
coincide. The growing prevalence of trusts, both inter vivos and testamentary, and of the use of the device of a power of appointment in
trust deeds and in wills, and the attempts of various states and countries
to tax both the creation of such powers and their exercise or the failure
to exercise them, render timely the collection of the cases involving
these questions and an attempt to develop the principles which have
moved the courts in deciding them.
It seems logical to take up first the jurisdictional question, which
has been considered by the courts chiefly in connection with inheritance
tax cases; other types of cases, however, such as those dealing with the
rights of the donee's "forced heirs" and creditors, should be treated
from the same viewpoint. In the light of the results of this jurisdictional study, one can then consider the authorities on the problem of
what law governs documents creating and exercising powers with
respect to both real estate (a comparatively easy question under the
authorities) and personalty. This latter problem, dealt with in numerous cases, may in turn be subdivided into three questions: namely,
what law governs (a) the construction of the donor's will or deed,
(b) the validity (formal and "essential") of the donee's exercise of the
power, and (c) the construction of the will or deed in which the donee
exercised it.
Nearly all questions of conflict of laws concerning property, as
well as other matters, can be considered from the two angles indicated
t A. B., 1929, Princeton University; LL. B., 1932, Harvard University; member of
the Philadelphia bar.
i. The earliest case found dealing with this problem is Tatnall v. Hankey, 2 Moore
P. C. C. 342 (1838) (what law governs the formal validity of the exercise of a power).
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above: what state has jurisdiction or power to determine who owns or
is entitled to the property, and what state's law will be applied to determine the construction, validity, and effect of acts or documents dealing
with the property. For example, a testator domiciled in State A may
die bequeathing to X property situated in State B. One may consider
the success of an attempt by either State A or State B, or perhaps by
another state, C (the domicil of X, or, in cases involving corporate
stock or evidences of indebtedness, the domicil of the corporation or of
the debtor), to provide by its laws who shall get that property. Any
of these states might attempt to confiscate all or a part of it by applying
their escheat laws or by taxing its transfer; or they might refuse to
allow X to receive it, on the ground, perchance, that X is a foreign
corporation or an alien. Likewise, any of these states might attempt to
give a part of the property to the testator's widow as a part of her
dower rights, or to give it to his creditors in payment of his debts.
From another viewpoint, one may attempt to determine the laws
of which state will be applied by the courts to determine the validity and
effect of the disposition of the property made by the testator. The
intimate connection between the answers to the two problems is clear.
If State A has jurisdiction to give the property to whom it will, its law,
unless as part of its own law it chooses to apply the law of some other
state, will govern the validity and effect of the deeds or wills of the
parties involved, who are in cases of powers of appointment the donor
and the donee. Those cases determining which state has the requisite
jurisdiction prove which law actually controls all such questions.
To consider first, therefore, this jurisdictional question, it has
often been pointed out that the privilege of inheritance is one that may
be granted or withheld by the government at will. 2 The "government"

referred to is the sovereign power having jurisdiction. Since this
government can withhold the privilege entirely, it, and it alone, can
withhold it in part by taxing the property or the right to inherit it. It
follows that the same government can (though it may not always do
so) determine who shall get the property not taken away by taxation.
These factors indicate the importance of determining which govermnent
has this power.
In cases not involving powers of appointment, it is now settled
(after much uncertainty) that the situs of real and tangible personal
property and the situs alone can properly levy such a tax.3 Likewise
the state of domicil of a decedent, and that state alone, can properly
2. See Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 140 (1925).

3. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, ig U. S. 194, 204 (19o5) ; Frick
v. Pennsylvania, 298 U. S. 473, 489, 492 (1925); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 293 U. S. 112, II8 (1934).
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levy such a tax on the decedent's intangible property, 4 to which for this
purpose is applied a fictional situs at that domicil.
Before considering the tax cases involving property subject to a
power of appointment, a problem peculiar to such property must be
discussed. In dealing with intangible property in the preceding discussion, there was only one possible owner and, consequently, only one
possible situs of the property for the purposes of the questions here
involved-the domicil of the testator or decedent. In the case of property subject to a power of appointment, however, there are two possible
owners, the donor and the donee, who must be considered in determining what place corresponds to the domicil of the testator in the ordinary
case. The donor, of course, originally owns the property. Usually he
gives it to the donee for life. If the donor had named a specific remainderman (instead of giving a power of appointment), his would be the
testator's domicil; and the property would go to the remainderman
from him. When there is a special power of appointment, giving the
donee the power to appoint the remainder among a class, it is likewise
clear that it is the donor's property which is involved. The donee cannot do what he wills with it but can only distribute it among the members of the class which is specified by the donor. When the power of
appointment, however, is a general power and is exercisable by deed
or will, the donee (if he is also the life tenant) has practically all the
attributes of ownership. It has been suggested that it is a mere fiction
to hold that he is not in fact the owner.5 Where the power is exercisable only by will (as is usually the case), however, the donee cannot
consume the property and hence lacks an essential attribute of ownership; and it certainly is no fiction where the donee is not the life tenant.
Moreover, at least until the donee makes an appointment (usually by
will effective only on his death), the property is still the donor's; for,
in default of appointment, it would pass as provided in the donor's
will. The mere fact that the donee does appoint the property to whomever he wishes makes no difference. The reason that the appointee takes
the property is that the donor wished an appointee of the donee to get
the property, and not merely that the donee wished him to get it. Ac4. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (i93o); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. I
(i93o) ; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (932).
Intangible prop-

erty subject to a power of appointment will rarely or never become "integral parts of
some local business" and, hence, taxable where the documents are located. Nashville
'Trust Co. v. Stokes, 118 S. W. (2d) 228 (Tenn. 1938).
5. See Notes (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 326, 327, (1935) 48 H.iv. L. Rav. 1202,
x239. Cf. Matter of Fearing, 2o0 N. Y. 340, 93 N. E. 956 (i9ii) ; Matter of Kissell,
142 App. Div. 934, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1127 (ist Dep't, 191I), afrg, 65 Misc. 443, 121

N. Y. Supp. io88 (Surr. Ct. i9o9).
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cordingly, it is well settled that it is the donor's property, 6 and that the
appointee takes the property from the donor and not from the donee. 7
The donee is merely an agent to complete the will or deed of the donor,
and his disposition of the property must be read into the donor's will
as if it had been written there originally by the donor himself.8
It is now time to consider the actual tax cases involving the power
to appoint. In view of the preceding discussion, the answer to the question in the case of real estate is easy. That state where the real estate
is located alone has jurisdiction to levy an inheritance tax on the property or its transfer through the exercise of or the failure to exercise a
power of appointment. It has been so held both where the donee and
not the donor, 9 and where the donor and not the donee,' was domiciled
at the situs; and even though the state of the situs may, in fact, not tax
it," no other state may levy such a tax.' 2 Since a mortgage is an
interest in land, the same rules should apply to mortgages. 13
6. McMurtry v. State, III Conn. 594, 15I At. 252 (193o); Sewall v. Wilmer,
132
Mass. 131 (1882) ; Walker v. Treasurer, 221 Mass. 6oo, zo9 N. E. 647 (1915)
; Matter
of Thomas, 39 Misc. 136, 78 N. Y. Supp. g8i (Surr. Ct. 192) ; Commonwealth
v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277 (1849); Cotting v. DeSartiges, 17 P- 1. 668, 24 Atl.
53o (1892) ;
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 P-R. .339, 142 Atl. 531 (1928)
; Tatnall
v. Hankey, 2 Moore P. C. C. 342 (1838) ; see MacClurkan v. Bugbee, io5
143 AtI. 757, 758 (1928), rev'd on other grounds, io6 N. J. L. 192, 15o Atl. N. J. L. 89,
443 (193o).
7. Lederer v. Pearce, 266 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 3d i92o), af'g, 262 Fed. 993
(E. D.
Pa. I919) ; Estate of Bowditch, I89 Cal. 377, 2o8 Pac. 282 (1922) ; Bartlett
v. Sears,
81 Conn. 34, 70 AtI. 33 (iqo8) ; In re Estate of Higgins, i94 Iowa 369,
(1922) ; Ligget v. Fidelity & Col. Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, II8 S. W. (2d)I89 N. W. 752
720 (1938) ;
Matter of Canda, i97 App. Div. 597, i89 N. Y. Supp. 917 (Ist Dep't, 1921);
Hollister
v. Hollister, 85 Ore. 316, i66 Pac. 940 (1917) ; Manning v. Board of Tax
Comm'rs, 46
R. L 400, 127 Atl. 865 (1925) ; see BEA.u, THE CONFLCT OF LAWS (I935)
MINOR, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1901) § I50; 2 WHARTON, CONFICr OF LAWS§ 118 E.2;
(3d ed.
i9o5) § 59oa; Note (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 379, 382.
8. Bartlett v. Sears, 8i Conn. 34, 7o Atl. 33 (i9O8) ; Matter of Bradford,
i59 Misc.
482, 288 N. Y. Supp. 153 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; see Matter of Burling,
148 Misc. 835, 842,
266 N. Y. Supp. 482, 490 (Surr. Ct 1933). See also MINOR, loc. cit.
supra note 8;
Notes (I9ii) 24 HARV. L. REv. 654, (925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 66r, 662.
analogous rule used in determining whether the appointment violates the Compare the
rule against
perpetuities. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 515.
9. Matter of Brett, 2o6 App. Div. 746, 2o0 N. Y. Supp. 915 (Ist Dep't, 1923)
; see
State v. Probate Ct., i24 Minn. 5o8, 511, i45 N. W. 390, 392 (914).
io. Manning v. Board of Tax Comm'rs, 46 R. I. 400, 127 Atl. 865 (1925); see
Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 2 Pa. C. C. 248, 253 (1886). But cf. Matter of
Fearing, 200
N. Y. 340, 93 N. E. 956 (IgII).
ii. In re Estate of Higgins, 194 Iowa 369, z89 N. W. 752 (1922) ; Matter
ing, 20o N. Y. 340, 93 N. E. 956 (IgII) ; Manning v. Board of Tax Comm'rs, of Fear46 R. I.
400, 127 At. 865 (925).
12. The contrary was held in Matter of Hull, 186 N. Y. 586, 79 N.
E. IIO7 (igo6),

aff'g without opinion, III App. Div. 322, 97 N. Y. Supp. 701 (2d Dep't,
1906). However, it seems clear that this case will not be followed in view of the later
Supreme
Court cases mentioned supra note 3.
13. Matter of Warden, 94 Misc. 563, 157 N. Y. Supp. Iuii (Surr.
Ct. I916) ; see
Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 2 Pa. C. C. 248, 253 (1886) ; GOOD ICH, CoNFLIcT
OF LAWS
(2d ed. 1938) § 57. But cf. Matter of Fearing, 200 N. Y. 340, 93 N. E.
956 (IgII) ;
Matter of Burch, i6o Misc. 342, 289 N. Y. Supp. 966 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; State
v. Probate
Ct., 124 Minn. 5o8, 145 N. W. 390 (914).
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The same rules do apply to tangible personal property subject to
a power of appointment.

Its permanent situs, 14 and that alone, 1 5 can

levy an inheritance tax on it.
In the case of intangible property, as has been pointed out, only
recently has the law been settled even as to property which is not subject to a power of appointment. Consequently, the earlier cases dealing
with property that is subject to such a power were in a considerable
state of confusion. The domicil of the donee,: 6 the situs of the security
(in the case of debts) 1 7 and the corporate domicil (in the case of corporate stock),' even though the domicil of the donor was different in
each case, were allowed to levy such a tax; and it has been held that
the domicil of the donor could not tax it.19 Apparently it is now clear,
however, that only the domicil of the owner can levy an inheritance tax
on intangible property,2 0 and that where such property is subject to a
power of appointment, that owner is the donor. 21 The United States
Supreme Court has accordingly denied validity to a tax attempted to be
levied by the domicil of the donee,2 2 thus approving the cases which
upheld taxes by the domicil of the donor 2 3 and others which denied the
x4. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 575 (1926), 40
v. Probate Ct., 124 Minn. 5o8, 512, 145 N. W. 390, 392
(1914) ; Estate of Bowditch, i89 Cal. 377, 380, 208 Pac. 282, 283 (1922) ; i BAI.z, loc.
cit. supra note 7; Note (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 326.
1S. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567 (1926). This
seems the inevitable conclusion from the Supreme Court decisions cited supra note 3.
The contray was apparently held, however, in State v. Probate Ct., 124 Minn. 5o8, 145
N. W. 39o (1914); cf. Note (1922) 35 HAgv. L. REv. 326.
i6. State v. Probate Ct., 124 Minn. 5o8, 145 N. W. 39o (1914) (bonds); In re
Frazier's Estate, 188 N. Y. Supp. i8g (Surr. Ct. 1912) (personalty of unspecified
type) ; In re Seaman's Estate, 187 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Surr. Ct. 1913) (a "fund"); Matter of Shepherd, 15o Misc. 653, 271 N. Y. Supp. i2O (Surr. Ct. 1934) (a "fund").
x7. Matter of Warden, 94 Misc. 563, 157 N. Y. Supp. uin (Surr. Ct. igi6). In
this case, bonds "located" in New York and secured by mortgages on New York property, were held taxable there. The donor, the donee, and the trustees were all domiciled and resided outside of New York.
i8. Clark v. Treasurer, 218 Mass. 292, 105 N. E. io55 (1914) (donor's domicil
was corporate domicil) ; Gardiner v. Treasurer, 225 Mass. 355, 114 N. E. 617 (1916)
(same-semble) ; and a number of New York lower court decisions, cited in Note
(1929) 64 A. L. R. 740.
i9. Clark v. Treasurer, 218 Mass. 292, 105 N. E. 1055 (1914) ; Matter of Fearing,
2oo N. Y. 340, 93 N. E. 956 (igi).
20. See cases cited supra note 4.
21. See cases cited supra notes 6-8.
22. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567 (I926), rev'g, i8g
N. C. 50, 126 S. E. 176 (1925). It should be noted that neither the situs of the securities nor the corporate domicil nor the place of business of the trustee coincided with the
domicil of the donee. The importance of this case is indicated by the numerous student
notes on it, among which are the following: (1927) 40 HARV. L. Rnv. 652, 25 MIcH.
L. REv. 786, 75 U. oF PA. L. REV. 372, 36 YALE L. J. 716.
23. Bonds and similar obligations: Clark v. Treasurer, 218 Mass. 292, 105 N. E.
1055 (1914) (upholding tax only as to bonds "located" at donor's domicil) ; Gardiner
HAnv. L. REv. 652 (1927) ; State
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right of any other jurisdiction to levy such a tax. 24 These cases must
be taken, therefore, as establishing the law, 5 and the earlier cases must
be considered as overruled.26
Three tax cases where the power was created by deed have arisen
and support this conclusion. They have held that the state where the
grantor of the trust was domiciled at the time of its creation, which was
v. Treasurer, 225 Mass. 355, 114 N. E. 617 (i9i6) ; Matter of the Trusts of the Will of
Wallop, x DeG., J. & Sm. 656 (Ch. 1864). Stock: Such a tax has been upheld by the
donor's domicil where it coincided with the corporate domicil, although it was not the
donee's domicil. Clark v. Treasurer, supra (denying tax on foreign corporate stock) ;
Gardiner v. Treasurer, mupra (semble); Matter of Kissell, 65 Misc. 443, 121 N. Y.
Supp. io88 (Surr. Ct. 19o9) (denying tax as to bonds and as to foreign corporate
stock). Miscellaneous: Nashville Trust Co. v. Stokes, 118 S. W. (2d) 228 (Tenn.
1938) (securities) ; see Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal. 377, 381, 208 Pac. 282, 283 (1922) ;
I BEALE, loc. cit. mpra note 7. In Matter of Davison, 236 App. Div. 684, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 42 (2d Dep't, 1932), it was held that a non-resident donee would have to pay a
tax on the "trust fund" involved at the domicil of the donor.
24. The domicil of the donee cannot tax intangibles. Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal.
377, 208 PaC. 282 (1922) ; McMurtry v. State, Iii Conn. 594, I5I Atl. 252 (930), discussed in Developments it the Law--Future Interests (1935) 48 HI-ARv. L. Rlv. 1202,
1247; Walker v. Treasurer, 221 Mass. 630, io9 N. E. 647 (i15); Matter of Brett, 206
App. Div. 746, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 915 (ist Dep't, 1923) (upholding, however, a tax on
stock of corporations domiciled at the donee's domicil) ; Matter of Burch, i6o Misc.
342, 289 N. Y. Supp. 966 (Surr. Ct. 1936) (securities located at donee's domicil, where
trustee resided) ; Matter of Sandford, 277 N. Y. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 374 (1938) (same);
Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277 (1849). See MacClurkan v. Bugbee, 105 N. J.
L. 89, 93, 143 At]. 757, 758 (1928) ; i BALEw,loc. cit. supra note 7. In Nashville Trust
Co. v. Stokes, i1S S. W. (2d) 228 (Tenn. 1938), the state of the trustee's residence
where the securities were located was denied the right to tax them.
25. This decision has been approved by text writers and editors. See recent case
notes cited supra note 22. See also i BEALE, loc. cit. supra note 7; 61 C. J. 16o6, i6o8,
1635, 1667; Note (1926) 24 MicH. L. R-v. 176. In Note (1922) 35 HAav. L. REv.
326, it is stated that the donor's domicil might levy such a tax, but that the donee's
domicil should also be able to do so, on the ground that it determines whether the
donee's will is a "will" within the meaning of the donor's will, authorizing the donee
"to appoint by will". This suggestion is untenable, in view of the authorities holding
that a will is a valid exercise of the power, if it is valid as under the law of the donor's
domicil, although it is not valid under the law of the donee's domicil. See cases cited
infra notes 96 and 98. These authorities show that the appointee's privilege of inheriting such property is not granted by the donee's domicil, although the contrary has been
suggested as the basis for a tax by the domicil of the donee. See Matter of Kissell, 65
Misc. 443, 445, 121 N. Y. Supp. io88, 1O89 (Surr. Ct. io)
; Matter of Fearing, 200
N. Y. 340, 344, 93 N. E. 956, 957 (1911). The suggestion in (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L.
REy. 372, that the donee's domicil could levy a tax on the act of exercising a power by
a local will is likewise untenable. It would measure the tax by property out of the
jurisdiction of the state levying the tax, and, as appears from the cases cited infra
notes 64, 93, 96 and 98, the donee's will is not required to be valid under the law of the
donee's domicil or to be probated there. The fact that the will is usually probated at
the donee's domicil is also immaterial, and furnishes no ground for a tax. Matter of
Brett, 206 App. Div. 746, 200 N. Y. Supp. 915 (ist Dep't, 1923) ; Matter of Sandford, 277
N. Y. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 374 (1938). But see Matter of Hull, 97 App. Div. 258, 89
N. Y. Supp. 939 (3d Dep't, 19o4) ; Matter of Canda, 197 App. Div. 596, 6o7, 611, 614,
189 N. Y. Supp. 917, 924, 926, 928 (Ist Dep't, 1921).
26. See (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 652, ix MINN. L. REV. 371; Note (1927) 12
CORN. L. Q. 379. In the Matter of Shepherd, 15o Misc. 653, 271 N. Y. Supp. 120 (Surr.
Ct. 1934), the earlier rule was followed and the domicil of the donee was allowed to tax
a "fund physically located" at the donor's domicil. The Wachov4a case is not cited.
Presumably it and similar cases were not called to the court's attention. But see In re
Simond's Estate, 188 Wash. 211, 61 P. (2d) 1302 (1936).

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

also, apparently, the seat of the trust 27 (the equivalent of the domicil
of the donor in the case of a testamentary trust) can levy an inheritance
tax on such property. Moreover, this conclusion was reached despite
the fact that the donee, who was also the grantor, died domiciled elsewhere and appointed the property to aliens, 28 and despite the fact the
trustees, after receiving local property, invested it in foreign stocks and
bonds. 2 9 The Supreme Court of Washington, however, in a somewhat
27. There has been considerable discussion as to what law governs a trust created
inter vivos or a "living trust". Beale, Living Trusts of Moveables in the Conflict of
Laws (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 969; Cavers, Trust Inter Vivos and the Conflict of
Laws (193o) 44 HARv. L. REv. 161; Swabenland, The Conflict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts of PersonalProperty (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 438. This question
is beyond the scope of this article. That law, however, whatever it is, takes the place
of the law of the donor's domicil in the case of powers created by will, and the phrase
"donor's domicil" must be understood here to mean the domicil of the testator in the
case of a power created by will or the law governing the trust in the case of a power
created inter vivos, as the case may be. That phrase also includes the law governing
the creation by contract of a power of appointment, as in the purchase of annuities. See,
e. g., Harlow v. Duryea, 48 R. I. 234, 238, 107 Atl. 98, 99 (1919), and Northwestern
Masonic Aid Ass'n v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99, io6, 26 Atl. 253, 254 (1893).
Where it has been a question of powers of appointment created inter vivos, generally the domicils of the donor and trustee and the situs of the property at the time
of the creation of the power have clearly or apparently coincided, and that law, although
different from the law of domicil of the donee, has been held to govern matters which,
in the case of a power created by will, would be governed by the law of the donor's
domicil. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 97o (C. C. A. ist, 1934) ;
Prince de Beam v. Winans, iii Md. 484, 74 At. 626 (19o9) ; Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N. E. 793 (1935) ; Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y. 6o2, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205, 472 (1936) ; McCreary's
Estate, 328 Pa. 513, 196 Atl. 25 (1938) ; In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts [1918] 2 Ch.
62o. Cf. Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, I16 N. E. 549 (1917); Harlow v. Duryea,
supra (annuities). The residence, as distinguished from the domicil, of the donee of
such a power, is, of course, immaterial. Re Daly's Settlement, 25 Beav. 456 (Rolls Ct.
1858). In some cases the law of the trustee's domicil (though it was not the donor's
or the donee's) is applied, that being apparently the situs of the property at the time of
the creation of the power. Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 578 (935) ; It re Simpson [1916] I Ch. 502. Cf. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (192o). Other cases, where the donor's
domicil did not clearly appear, apply to such matters the law of the trustee's domicil
(apparently the situs of the property at the time of the creation of the power) though
it is not the domicil of the donee. Tudor v. Vail, 195 Mass. 18, 8o N. E. 590 (1907) ;
In re Anziani [193o] x Ch. 407; Re Wilkinson [1934] I D. L. R- 544 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
1933). Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 195 N. E. 529 (935), 44 YALE
L. J. goi. Other cases apply to these matters the law of the domicil of the donee
though it is neither the situs nor the domicil of either the donor or the trustee. Radford
v. Fidelity & Col. Trust Co., 185 Ky. 453, 215 S. W. 285 (1919) ; Maynard v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 238 N. Y. 592, 144 N. E. 905 (1924), aff'g without opinion, 208 App.
Div. 112, 203 N. Y. Supp. 83 (ist Dep't, 1924). Cf. Re Ross Marriage Settlement, 16
Ont. W. R- 327 (igio) ; In re Askew [193o] 2 Ch. 259. The law stipulated by the parties to the deed of trust may govern such matters. White v. Holly, 8o Conn. 438, 68

Atl. 997 (i9o8) ; cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, supra.

RESTATEmENT, ComNLIcr

OF

LAWs (1934) § 284: "The creation inter vivos of a power to appoint chattels is determined by the law of the state in which the chattels are at the time of the creation of the
power." A later change in the domicil of the donor or donee is immaterial. White v.
Holly, supra; Tudor v. Vail, supra; see Barret v. Berea College, 48 R. I. 258, 262, 137
Atl. 145, 147 (1927). But cf. Re Ross Marriage Settlement, supra. As to the effect of
the change of trustees, see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 186 Atl.
9o3 (Del. Ch. 1936), 37 COL. L. REv. 125 (1937) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, supra.
28. In the Matter of Lovelace's Settlement, 4 DeG. & J. 340 (Ch. 1849).
29. In re Cigala's Settlement Trusts, 7 Ch. D. 351 (1878).
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similar case has, erroneously it would seem, upheld a tax by the domicil
of the donee.3 °
No cases involving a conflict of laws have been found where there
was an attempt to tax the exercise of a power by deed, but it seems
clear that the same rules would apply-allowing the state of the donor's
domicil, and it alone, to tax intangibles, while the situs alone could tax
tangible personalty and real estate.
One of the rare cases concerning the conflict of laws and powers
of appointment which was considered from the jurisdictional viewpoint involved successive appointments. A Massachusetts donor gave
a Rhode Island donee a power which was exercised by an appointment
to a New Yorker for life with a further power to appoint the ultimate
remainderman. It was held that New York had no jurisdiction over
the property.3 1 In such cases it seems that the first donee merely delegates his authority to appoint; the property remains the original donor's,
from whom the ultimate remaindermen take it. Its transfer would thus
be taxable, just as though there had been no third party intervening, by
the state of the situs or, in the case of intangibles, by the state of the
32
domicil of the original donor.
Most of the cases just discussed were decided on the ground that
the particular state involved did or did not have jurisdiction over the
property in question. It has since been held by the Supreme Court that
the limitations formerly worked out were not jurisdictional but only
constitutional. 33 Hence they did not apply to the Federal Government,
which has jurisdiction to tax bonds and stock certificates representing
debts of and stock in foreign corporations, owned by a non-resident
alien, if they were physically located in America.3 4 Domicil, citizenship,
situs, source of income, all may give jurisdiction to tax. So now the
exercise by a non-resident alien of a power of appointment over stock
in an American corporation, the certificates for which are held abroad,
may be taxed by the Federal Government. 5 Consequently the earlier
cases are not conclusive of what state can or cannot, as a jurisdictional
30. In re Simond's Estate, 188 Wash. 21i, 6I P. (2d) 1302 (1936); see Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 2 Pa. C. C. 248, 253 (1886).
31. Matter of Bradford, 159 Misc. 482, 288 N. Y. Supp. I53 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
32. Ibid. But cf. Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337

(1926).

33. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933). See Buchanan and Myers, The Administrationof Intangiblesin View of FirstNationalBank v. Maine (1935) 48 HAnv. L.
Rv. 911, 947.
34. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933).
35. Commissioner v. Nevins, 76 F. (2d) iO9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296
U. S.591 (1935); Note (935) 48 HARv.L. REv. 12o2, 1248.
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matter and from a conflict of laws viewpoint, tax property subject to a
power. Being decided largely on jurisdictional grounds, however, it
is believed they are helpful in determining this question, and hence in
determining what state has power to apply its own law to wills and deeds
creating and exercising powers of appointment.
Another problem has sometimes been presented to the courts
which should also be considered from a jurisdictional viewpoint. What
state can restrict the capacity of a donee to appoint property subject to
a power, or can give it, despite the donee's wishes, to his widow, children or other "forced. heirs" or to his creditors?
This question has been little discussed by the text writers.3 6 The
rights of the donee's "forced heirs", it seems, are essentially similar
to dower and curtesy rights, and are closely analogous to the rights of
a donee's creditors to property subject to a power of appointment. One
suggestion is that the statutes restricting testamentary capacity or giving a percentage of a decedent's property to his spouse, children, or
parents, regardless of his will, should not apply to property subject to
a power of appointment since this is not the donee's property. It has
been so held in interpreting some statutes giving rights to "forced heirs"
of the donee where the statute attempted to be invoked by such heirs
was that of the donor's domicil.3 7 But assuming that such statutes
are construed to include property subject to a power of appointment, it
remains to be decided which statute-that of the donor's or that of the
donee's domicil---can effectively do so, and also whether a statute or
rule of common law at either of those places or both can subject such
property to the claims of the donee's creditors. The cases indicate that
the law of the situs (the donor's domicil in the case of intangibles) has
jurisdiction to give the property to "forced heirs" of the donee 31 or to
his creditors. 39 The law of the donee's domicil should have nothing to
do with this question and, it has been rightly held, cannot restrict the
capacity of the donee (capable under the law of the donor's domicil) to
36. See 2 BEAL, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 234.1, 235.1, 285.1; DiCEy, CONFLICt F
LAWS (5th ed. 1932) Rules 198, 2o2, discussed infra p. 412; MINOM, loc. cil. supra note
7; Note (191I) 24 HAav. L. Ray. 654, reviewing In re Pryce [i91] 2 Ch. 286, rev'g,

13o L. T. 415.
37. Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882) ; Matter of Barnhart, 137 Misc. 518,
244 N. Y. Supp. 13o (Surr. Ct. 193o); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony,
49 R. I. 339, 142 AtI. 531 (1928).
38. Ibid. (cases holding the statute gave forced heirs of the donee no right to the
property subject to a power of appointment). Cf. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 283.r.
-See also the English cases (now overruled) cited infra note 43.
39. Seward v. Kaufman, 1I9 N. J. Eq. 44, i8o AtI. 857 (Ch. 1935). See Pearce v.
Lederer, 262 Fed. 993, 998, XOOO (E. D. Pa. i919); Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, 21
F. (2d) 164, i6j (C. C. A. 3d, 1927); Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277, 280
(1849). Cf. cases cited infra note 42.
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execute a will appointing the property 4 0 nor can it 42give the property
either to the donee's forced heirs 41 or to his creditors.
In England, however, a different result has been reached in the
case of a general power of appointment only. It has been held, contrary to earlier cases, 43 that the donee, by the exercise of the power,

makes the property a part of his estate for all purposes: and that,
being part of his estate, it is subject to the law of his domicil giving
a proportion of it to his forced heirs. 44 Even in England, however, a
contrary rule still prevails as to special powers. 45 The English rule
is approved by Dicey, who contends that the donee in the case of a
special power is expressing the donor's wishes, and that consequently,
40. Matter of Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (935), discussed in Note (1937) 5o HAgv. L. Rav. 1l19, 1155; Matter of Marsland's Estate, 142
Misc. 230, 254 N. Y. Supp. 293 (193i); In re M~gret [I9OI] I Ch. 547; In re Macken-

zie [igiI] I Ch.578; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 234. In effect the same rule
was applied in the following cases where the forced heirs of the donee under the laws
of his domicil attempted unsuccessfully to reach the property: Prince de Beam v.
Winans, IIIMd. 434, 74 Atl. 626 (I9O9) ; Matter of Marsland's Estate, supra; In re
Hernando, 27 Ch.D. 284 (1884) ; Pouey v. Hordern [19oo] I Ch. 492; It re Mdgret,
supra; In re Mackenzie, .upra. Contra: In re Pryce [1911] 2 Ch. 286; cf. In re
Lewal's Settlement Trusts [1918] 2 Ch. 391. The question whether a donee with testamentary capacity under the law of his domicil, but not under that of the donor's, can
execute a will appointing the property depends on different considerations. See infra
p. 421. See also 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 235.1 (situs alone governs capacity
as to real estate); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 234 (same); DicEy, op. cit.
supra note 36, Rule 198 (the law of either domicil can give capacity). See also In re
Lewal's Settlement Trusts, supra; cf. Matter of the Will of Stewart, ii Paige 398 (N.

Y. 1845).
41. See authorities cited supra note 4o.
42. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 At. 531 (1928);
Adger v. Kirk, 116 S. C. 298, 1o8 S. E. 97 (1921). See cases cited supra note 39. It
was so held in In re Bald, 66 L. J. Ch. 524 (1897), but this case has apparently been
overruled. In re Pryce [1911] 2 Ch. 286. It has been criticized as wrong. DicEy, op.
cit. supra note 36, Rule 202. In Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 31 F. (2d) 469,
474 (D. Md. 1929), af'd, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1930), cert. denied, 281 U. S.
133 (193o), and in Maynard v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 208 App. Div. i12, 2o3
N. Y. Supp. 83 (Ist Dep't, 1924), the courts applied the law of its domicil to determine
the capacity of the corporate appointee to take the property. However, when the latter
case came up again, sub nom. Matter of Thompson's Estate, 245 N. Y. 565, 157 N. E.
859 (1927), the court without discussion applied the law of the donee's domicil, which
was New York, to determine whether the donee had so blended the property subject to
the power of appointment with his own property, that it should go to pay the general
legacies instead of going in accordance with the residuary clause to the charitable corporation. This question, however, is a question of the donee's intention and of the construction of the donee's will, i. e., it is a question of to whom the donee intended to and
did appoint the property. It is not a question of whether the law of the donee's domicil
can, regardless of the donee's will, give the property to his forced heirs or creditors. A
similar situation might occur in a state like Pennsylvania, where it has been held that
the creditors take the property, if at all, because they are appointees and not because
the law of the donee's domicil gives it to them. See Pearce v. Lederer, 262 Fed. 993,
998 (E. D. Pa. 1919).
43. In re Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 (1884) ; In re Mfgret [i9oi] i Ch. 547; In re
Mackenzie [1911] I Ch.578; In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts [19i8] 2 Ch.391. These
last three cases were not considered by the court in deciding In re Pryce [1911] 2 Ch.
286. See Dlcv, op. cit supra note 36, Rule 202.
44. In re Pryce [1911] 2 Ch. 286. This case also in effect overruled In re Bald, 66
L. J. Ch. 524 (1897), which dealt with the rights of creditors. It is criticized in Note
(191i) 24 HARv.L.

REv.654.

45. Pouey v. Hordern [19oo] I Ch. 492, distinguished in In re Pryce on this
ground; In re Mackenzie [1911] i Ch. 578.
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incapacity by the laws of the donee's domicil and the rights of the
donee's forced heirs should be immaterial. In the case of a general
power, however, the donee is said to be expressing his own will as to
the disposition of the property so that the rights of his heirs, given by
the law of his domicil, should govern. 46 This argument disregards the
fact that it is the donor's property of which the donee is disposing, and
that the appointees take from the donor and not from the donee. 47 It
also disregards the fact that the appointees take the property because
the donor wanted the appointees of the donee, whoever they might be,
to have it, and not merely because the donee wished them to have it.
The donee's domicil, of course, but for the power of appointment,
would have no jurisdiction to take the donor's property and give it to
the donee's forced heirs or creditors. The fact that the law of the
donor's domicil allowed the final recipients of the donor's bounty to be
designated by a person domiciled elsewhere does not subject the property to the jurisdiction of that person's domicil. Nor should it be sufficient to permit the law of that state to take the property away from the
appointees and give it to the donee's forced heirs or creditors. Probably no one would argue that it could take the property from the appointees and give it to the state under escheat statutes. The situations
are substantially the same.
These cases are more helpful than the tax cases in deciding what
law governs wills of property subject to a power of appointment. But
although the question involved, like that in the tax cases, is a matter of
jurisdiction, usually the courts have considered it as a problem of determining what law governs the validity and effect of a will exercising such
a power. One cannot lift oneself by one's bootstraps. Hence we must
look further for a conclusive answer to the latter type of problem.
It is indicated by the foregoing that the law of the situs has exclusive jurisdiction at least over real estate. It alone can tax real estate
or give it to a donee's forced heirs or creditors. The courts of the situs,
therefore, have power to determine the validity and effect of the deeds
or wills of the donor and donee by applying its own law, and they have
done so. That law governs all matters concerning powers of appointment over realty. 48 This is the rule laid down both by the Restatement
46. See DicEy, op. cit. supra note 36, Rules 198, 202.

47. See authorities cited supra notes 6-8.
48. Many cases were found where the court referred to "property" or the like,
without expressly stating whether it was personalty or real estate. It seems probable
that in such cases personalty was involved, and they are, therefore, cited under appropriate notes dealing with such property. See, e. g., several of the cases cited supra
notes 8, 27, 39. Others are: Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 151 Md. 321, 134
AtI. 497 (1926), wtrit of error dismissed, 274 U. S. 724 (1927) ; Camden Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Fitler, 123 N. J. Eq. 245, 197 AtL 249 (Ch. 1938) ; City Bank Farmers
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of Conflict of Laws 49 and by the text writers. 50 In most of the cases,
it so happened that the domicil of the donor was the same as the situs
though that of the donee was different. Hence with respect to matters
which the law of the donor's domicil would govern had it been personal property, these cases are not square holdings that the law of the
situs governs although, with respect to those matters which would be
governed in the case of personalty by the law of the donee's domicil
the contrary is true. Thus, it has been held that the law of the situs,
which was also the donor's domicil, but not the donee's, governs the
following: the validity of a power of appointment as a matter of law
and public policy,51 the character of a power created over realty and
the right of the donee to release it,52 the formal validity of the donee's
will as an exercise of the power, 53 and the questions whether a general
devise is an exercise of a power or whether the property or the power
must be specifically referred to by the donee," whether the appointment violates the rule against perpetuities and the effect of such violaTrust Co. v. Whiteing, 136 Misc. 416, 241 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 Atl. 531 (i928); Crookenden
v. Fuller, I Swa. & Tr. 44i (Prob. 1859) ; In the Goods of Hallyburton, L. R. i P. D.
29 (1865) ; It re Kerwan's Trusts, 25 Ch. D. 373 (1883) ; Milnes v. Foden [i89o] 59
L. J. Pro. Div. & Ad. 62; Hummel v. Hummel [1898] i Ch. 642; In re Baker's Settlement Trusts [igo8] W. N. i61; Murphy v. Deichler [igog] A. C. 446; In re Wilkinson's Settlement [1917] i Ch. 62o; In re Strong, 95 L. J. Ch. 22 (1925) ; Velasco v.
Coney [1934] P. 143, 83 U. oF PA. L. REV. 279 (1935), Note (1935) 48 Hav. L. REv.
1241.

2

49. RESTATEmENT, CoNFLICT op LAWS §§ 234-236.
5o. See GooDIcH, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 171-173; MINOR, loc. cit. supra note 7;
BEAL, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 234.1-236.1.
5I. Matter of Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935)

(donor

domiciled in California-situs of realty apparently California).
52. Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N. Y. Supp. 573 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
53. Topham v. Portland, i DeG., J. & Sn. 517 (1863) (validity of charge on land).
Applying this rule, the will of the donee has been held a valid exercise of the power:
In the Goods of Trefond [1899] P. 247; In the Goods of Vannini [i9oi] P. 330 semble;
Murphy v. Deichler [igo9] A. C. 446. The exercise was held invalid under this rule
in Blount v. Walker, 28 S. C. 545, 6 S. E. 558 (i888), zrit of error disissed, 134
U. S. 607 (i889). See Ward v. Stanard, 82 App. Div. 386, 8i N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (2d
Dep't, i9o3). A different rule prevails in Scotland, however, where a will, valid by
the law of the donee's domicil but not by the law of the situs, which was also the donor's
domicil, for lack of witnesses, has been held to be a valid execution of a power. Brack
v. Johnston, 5 Wils. & S. 6i (1831).
54. Power held not exercised: In re Kelley's Will, 161 Misc. 255, 291 N. Y. Supp.
86o (Surr. Ct. 1936), Note (i937) 5o HARv. L. REv. iiig, 1155. Power held exercised:
Art Students' League v. Hinldey, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1930) semble; Security
Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Ward, io Del. Ch. 4o8, 93 Atl. 385 (1915); Sewall v.
Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882) ; Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, ii6 N. E. 549 (917) ;
Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926). But see In re
Harman [1894] 3 Ch. 607. In that case, an English donor by will left English personal
property and real estate to English trustees to pay the income to the donee for life, with
a power of appointment. The trustees sold the real estate and bought personal property. The donee died domiciled in France, leaving a will which, by French law, passed
all personal property over which she had a power of disposition. Kekewich, J., held
that this will was an execution of the power. He did not consider the conflict of laws
point, since it would have been an exercise under § 27 of the English Wills Act, but
held that it was also an exercise in accordance with the French law.
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tion," whether an appointment to charity is void for indefiniteness of
beneficiaries,5" whether the donee's creditors or "forced heirs" are en-

titled to share in it, and whether the donee is capable of exercising the
power. 5 7

In a few cases the situs was either clearly or apparently different
from the domiciles of the donor and of the donee; in such cases its
law has been held to govern the validity of an appointment in trust,56
the formal validity of the exercise of the power, 59 the question whether
a general devise is an exercise of the power, 60 and the question whether

the appointment violates the rules against perpetuities or restraints on
alienation, 6 as well as the capacity of the donee to make a will.6 2 So
the formal validity of the exercise of such a power by deed is governed
by the law of the situs. 63 The will of the donee must be probated at the

situs to be a muniment of title.6 4 Probate at the donee's domicil is not
decisive of its validity for this purpose. 5 However, the law of the corporate domicil and not that of the situs determines the capacity of a
corporate appointee to take such property.66
55. Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4th, i93o) ; Bundy
v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926) ; Ligget v. Fidelity &
Col. Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S. W. (2d) 72o (1938) ; Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa.
354, 2o Atl. 521 (i8go). See also In re Kelley's Will, 16i Misc. 255, 291 N. Y. Supp.
86o (Surr. Ct. 1936).
56. Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) (also
applying the law of the domicil of a corporate appointee to determine its capacity to
take the property). Contra: Bible Soc. v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 (1873). The facts
of this case, however, are not strictly in point so that it may possibly be distinguished
on the ground that the donee was merely an agent of the donor instead of a donee with
a power of appointment, and also on the theory that the direction in the donor's deed to
sell the real property converted it at once to personalty. Such conversion should be
immaterial however. Murray v. Champernowne [1901] 2 Ir. R. 232. But see Ackerman v. Ackerman, 8I N. J. Eq. 437, 86 Atl. 542 (Ch. 1913).
57. The cases on these questions are cited supra notes 38-45.
58. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920).
59. Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285, io8 S. E. 411 (i889) ; Murray v. Champernowne [1901] 2 Ir. R. 232 (the court held that there was a valid exercise of the
power, but stated that it would have been invalid if void by the law of the situs, though
valid by the law of the donee's domicil). See Lindsay v. Wilson, io3 Md. 252, 63 Atl.

566 (i9o6).
6o. In re Kelley's Will, I6I Misc. 225, 291 N. Y. Supp. 86o (Surr. Ct. 1936) (holding power not exercised) ; Murray v. Champernowne [9oi] 2 Ir. R. 232 (holding
power exercised) ; Re Wilkinson [i934] i D. L. R. 544 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1933). Contra:
Ackerman v. Ackerman, 8I N. J. Eq. 437, 86 Atl. 542 (Ch. 1913) semble.
61. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920) ; Miller v. Douglas,
192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927). See also It re Kelley's Will, i6i Misc. 255, 291
N. Y. Supp. 86o (Surr. Ct. 1936).
62. Matter of the Will of Stewart, ii Paige 398 (N. Y. 1845).
63. Topham v. Portland, i DeG., J. & Sm. 517 (1863) (the donor's but not the
donee's domicil was the same as the situs). See In re Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 (884)
(same). Cf. In re Anziani [1930] i Ch. 407 semble.
64. Goldsmith v. Petersen, I5! Iowa 692, 141 N. W. 6o (913).
Cf. in the Goods
of Trefond [1899] P. 247.
65. Goldsmith v. Petersen, i59 Iowa 692, 141 N. W. 6o (913) ; Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285 (i889).
66. Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4 th, i930). Cf.
Maynard v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 2o8 App. Div. 112, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 83 (1924).
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It has been suggested that, on the. same logical grounds applicable
to the case of personalty,6 7 the law of the situs should not govern the
form 68 and the interpretation of the donee's will, including such matters as whether a general devise is an exercise of the power. 69 But the
70
law is now settled in accordance with the above cases to the contrary.
It should be noted that the governing law is determined by the state
of facts arising at the creation of the power. Thus, the fact that the
trustees sold real estate and purchased personal property with the proceeds has been held not to vary the determination of what law governs
these matters. 71 Conversely, if the trustees later invest in real estate in
a jurisdiction other 72 than that which first governed the power, this
78
change has been held by courts of the latter jurisdiction immaterial.
Of course, that a power over real estate is created inter vivos and not
by will makes no difference.

74

The problem is further complicated with respect to personal property.

It is true that "the power to regulate transmission .

.

. and

distribution of tangible personal property on the death of the owner
rests with the State of its situs . . . the laws of other States have no

bearing save as that State expressly or tacitly adopts them-their, bearing then being attributable to such adoption and not to any force of
67. See infra p. 419.
68. See 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 7.
69. See MINoR, loc. cit. supra note 7; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883)
§473 (a), n. (a).
7o. See cases cited mipra notes 53-54, 59-6o. RESTATEmENT, CoNFLicr OF LAWS
§ 236.
71. Matter of Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935) ; Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, i16 N. E. 549 (917) ; Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235,
126 N. E. 461 (I92O) ; In re Harman [1894] 3 Ch. 6o7; Re Wilkinson [1934] 1 D. L.

R. 544 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1933). Contra: Bible Soc. v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 (1873).
72. Of course, an investment in real estate in the same jurisdiction has no effect on
the governing law. Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889) ; In re Anziani
[i93o] i Ch.407.

73. Bartlett v. Sears, 8i Conn. 34, 7o Atl. 33 (1908) (rule against perpetuitieswhether appointment was within terms of special power) ; Greenough v. Osgood, 235
Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (192o); Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. i58, 21 N. E. 91 (1889).
It is doubtful whether the courts of the state where such real estate is located would
apply this rule. In view of the general rule that the law of the situs governs all matters having to do with real estate, it seems that they could be correct in refusing to do
so, although comity and convenience urge otherwise.
74. The following cases, involving powers of appointment over real estate created
by deed, held that the law of the situs governs: Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Ward, io Del. Ch.408, 93 Atl. 385 (1915); Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, 16 N. E.

549 (1917); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (19i2o); Bundy v.

United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926) ; Newton v. Hunt, 59
Misc. 633, 112 N. Y. Supp. 573 (Sup. Ct. 19o8) ; Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285,
io8 S. E. 411 (1889) ; Miller v. Douglas, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927) ; Topham
v. Portland, i DeG., J. & Sm. 517 (1863) ; In re Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 (1884) ; In
the Goods of Trefond [1899] P. 247; In the Goods of Vannini [1901] P. 330; Murray
v. Champernowne [igoil] 2 Ir. R. 232; Re Wilkinson [1934] 1 D. L. R. 544 (Ont. Sup.

Ct. 1933). Contra: Brack v. Johnston, 5 Wils. & S. 61 (183i) ; Bible Soc. v. Pendleton,
7 W. Va. 79 (873).
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their own". 75 Apart from statute, however, the courts of the situs of
such property, instead of applying its law when asked to determine the

effect or validity of a will concerning it, apply as part of its own law,
There may be no particular
the law of the decedent's last domicil..7
reason, apart from convenience, why the rule that the law of the domicil
of the testator governs these matters should be adopted today; but this
question has long been settled, and having become established as a rule

of property, it may not now be departed from.
It follows that, when the problem concerns the construction or

effect of the will of the donor of a power of appointment, it is the law
of the donor's domicil that is to govern. It has frequently been so
held. Thus the meaning of the words used by the donor is governed

by the law of the donor's domicil and not that of the donee so that the
law of the donor's domicil determines whether the donee of a special
power has appointed to persons within the terms of the power. 77 Likewise, it is not the law of the donee's domicil but that of the donor's

which determines whether the donee of a special power can appoint
in trust for those named in the power. 7 The same rule is applied in
That
determining whether a power is exercisable by deed or will. 7
law, likewise, governs the character of the power, 0 the ability of the
donor and donee to terminate it,8 1 the right of the donee to release it,82
the right to revoke an appointment, and the effect of appointing by deed
to unborn persons as divesting the interest of persons entitled to take
See also: RESTATEMENT,
75. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 491 (925).
CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 303; 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 303.1, 303.3; GoDmRcH, op.
cit. supra note 13, § 161.
76. As appears in 2 BA.E, op. Cit. stpra note 7, §§ 303.1, 303.3, a few states by
statute apply their own law to determine the distribution of local chattels of an intestate
decedent. Even these states agree with the others, however, in applying the law of a
testator's last domicil to determine the validity and effect of his will. See RESTATEop. cit. supra note 7, §§ 303.3, 306.1-307.I ;
MENT, CO NFICT OF LAWS §§ 3o6-7; 2 BF-,
GOODRcH, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 164-165. The same authorities show, however, that,
as indicated by the quotation in the text, the courts of the situs apply such law as part
of their ow; law.
77. Bartlett v. Sears, Sr Conn. 34, 70 Atl. 33 (i9o8) ; McCreary's Estate, 328 Pa.
513, 196 AtI. 25 (938).
Cf. RESTATEFENT, CoNFLIcr OF LAws § 285. But if the power
was to appoint among "children", the legitimacy of the child to whom the donee appointed the property is determined by the law of its or of its parents' domicil, regardless of the law governing the exercise or creation of the power. Holloway v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 15i Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497 (1926), approved in (1927) 27 CoL. L.
REv. 9I, 25 MicH. L. Ray. i89; ln re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259, 44 Hagv. L. REF. 292.
Cf. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n v. Jones, i54 Pa. 99, 26 Atl. 253 (893).
78. Cf. Bartlett v. Sears, 8i Conn. 34, 7o AtI. 33 (19o8) ; Greenough v. Osgood,
235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920).
79. Ward v. Stanard, 82 App. Div. 386, 8I N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (2d Dep't, 19o3).
go. Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N. Y. Supp. 573 (Sup. Ct. 1908) ; 12 C. J.
126o.
81. Chase National Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y. 6o2, 659, 3 N. E.
(2d) 205, 472 (1936); cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 195 N. E. 529

0g3s).

82. Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633,
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in default of appointment. 83 It also governs the effect of an attempted
appointment to such persons and of their renunciation and decision
to take as in default, which may be of the utmost importance for tax
purposes.8 4
However, when the question is no longer one of merely construing
the donor's will but of determining the validity and effect of the exercise of a power of appointment, an additional question is involved. It
is necessary to analyze such powers further.8 5 When the donor gives
property to the donee for life with a power of appointment, he generally provides that after the donee dies it shall go as the donee shall
"by will appoint". Since it is the donor's property which is being given
by the donee, the donee being merely an agent of the donor,8 6 the question whether the donee has validly appointed it depends upon his compliance with the authority given to him by the donor, i. e., whether the
donee has "appointed" the property by "will".8

7

Thus, it all comes

down to a question of construing the donor's will or deed.
That this is true is shown by cases where the donor has expressly
made certain formal requirements as to witnesses, or the like, in the
document exercising a power, which would not otherwise be necessary
under the applicable law. Whether such law be considered the law
of the donee's domicil or that of the donor's domicil, such requirements
must be met.8 8 Conversely, if the donor stipulated that the donee's
will should be considered a valid exercise of the power if it complied
with certain requisites, it will be so considered although it is not executed in compliance with the law that would otherwise be applied to it.8 9
This same fact, that the problem is here a question of construction,
makes it constitutional for a court of the donor's domicil to refuse
full faith and credit to a decision of the courts of the donee's domicil
83. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. I, 195 N. E. 529 (1935).
84. Grinnell v. Commissioner, 7o F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), aff'd, 294 U. S.

153 (i935).
66,.

85. An excellent analysis of the problem appears in Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv.

86. See authorities cited supra notes 7-9.
87. See D'Huart v. Harkness, 34 Beav. 324 (Rolls Ct. 1865); In re Wilkinson's
Settlement [1917] L.i R~v.
Ch. 62o;
Beale, Progressof the Law (r9g8-i)-Conflict of Laws
1, 1&-17.
(1919)

33 HARV.

88. Baretto v. Young [19OO] 3 Ch. 339. See 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 7;
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287, comment c; Notes (Igio) 23 HARV. L. REV.
222, (igoo) IO9 L. T. 339. But cf. DICEY, op. cit. opra note 36, Rule 200. It has been
held, however, that, at least in the case of an attempted appointment to children of the
donee, equity will aid an execution defective because it did not comply with the requirements of the donor's will. In re Walker [19o8] i Ch. 56o. See Ward v. Stanard, 82
App. Div. 386, 8i N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (2d Dep't, 1903) ; 2 BEAi., op. cit. supra note 7,

§ 287.1.

89. White v. Holly, 8o Conn. 438, 68 Atl. 997 (i9o8); Aubert's Appeal, iog Pa.
447, i Atl. 336 (1885). But see DICEY, op. cit. supra note 36, Rule i99. This seems
obviously correct since the donor could have made the power exercisable by deed.
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refusing to probate, 90 or probating and holding valid, 9 1 the donee's
will. The courts of the donor's domicil, by so doing,. are not holding
that the donee's will is or is not valid as a will. They are merely
deciding that it is or is not a "will" within the meaning of the donor
when he provided that the property should go to the parties to whom
the donee should appoint by "will". This is a very different question.
Indeed, as a general rule, the donee's will in such cases must be probated at the donor's domicil, as well as at the donee's, 92 and can be
there probated although it has not been probated at the donee's
93
domicil.
Since the formal validity of the donee's will as an exercise of the
power is therefore to be governed by the meaning intended by the donor
when he used the word "will", that meaning must be sought. It has
been suggested that the donor, if he considered the matter at all, meant
any legal instrument.94 This goes too far; probably the donor meant
a document valid as a testamentary disposition of the donee's own property. On this theory, since the law of a testator's domicil always governs the validity of his will as to personal property, the law of the
donee's domicil should always govern the formal validity of a will exercising a power over personalty, and it has been often so suggested.9 5
Accordingly, it is settled in England that a will, valid by the law of the
donee's domicil, is a valid exercise of the power although it would be
void for formal defects if the law of the donor's domicil were applied.96
go. In re Harriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 208 N. Y. Supp. 672 (Surr. Ct. 1924),
Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 661. Cf. Matter of Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319,
46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935). See Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y.
6o2, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205, 472 (1936).
9I. Blount v. Walker, 134 U. S. 6o7 (1889) ; cf. Goldsmith v. Petersen, 159 Iowa
692, 141 N. W. 6o (1913). See Chase Nat Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271
N. Y. 6o2, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205, 472 (936).
92. In re Harriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 672 (Surr. Ct. 1924);
Ex parte Limehouse Bd. of Works, 24 CI. D. I77 (1883).
93. Matter of Sandford, 277 N. Y. 323, 14 N. E. (2d) 374 (1938); Tatnall v.
Hankey, 2 Moore P. C. C. 342 (x838) ; In the Goods of Hallyburton, L. R. i P. & D.
go (1866); In the Goods of Trefond [1899] P. 247; Note (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 379.
Cf. D'Huart v. Harkness, 34 Beav. 324 (Rolls Ct. I868), applying the statute, i Vicr.
C. 26, § 9 (837), which provided that a will of the donee of a power, not domiciled in
England, was probatable in England if executed in accordance with the forms required
by the law of his domicil. Milnes v. Foden [i89o] 59 L. J. Pro. Div. & Ad. 62.
94. Ward v. Stanard, 82 App. Div. 386, 8i N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (2d Dep't, 1903). The
court did not undertake to define the term "legal instrument", obviously almost an impossible task under its suggestion.
95. DrcEy, op. cit. supra note 36, comment to Rules i98, I99; GooDRicE, op. cit.
supra note 13, §§ 171-173; MINoR, loc. cit. supra note 7; Notes (i9o6) i9 HAuv. L. Rxv.
122, (1922) 35 HAZv. L. REV. 326, (925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 66I.
96. D'Huart v. Harkness, 34 Beav. 324 (Rolls Ct. x865) ; Milnes v. Foden [189]
59 L. J. Pro. Div. & Ad. 62 senble; In re Price [i9oo] i Ch. 442; In re Walker [i9o]
i Ch. 56o; In re Wilkinson's Settlement [1917] i Ch. 62o; In re Lewals Settlement
Trusts [i918] 2 Ch. 391; I' re Strong [1925] 95 L. J. Ch. 22. See In re Este's Settlement Trusts [19o3] i Ch. 893, 9o3; In re Wernher [I918] 2 Ch. 82, 92. Some of the
above cases relied on an English statute which so provided under certain circumstances.
The following two contrary cases must be considered overruled: In re Kerwan's Trusts,
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97
Although there has been some dissent from this view in America,
the weight of American authority supports the English rule.9 8 However, a document which, as to form, complies with the requirements
of wills according to the law of the donor's domicil at the time of the
creation of the power would also probably be a "will" within the donor's
meaning; and it has long been settled that such a document is a valid
exercise of the power even though it does not comply with the formal
requirements of the law of the donee's domicil. 9 Hence, the courts
have, at least in England, concluded that the donor meant (or would
have meant had he thought of it) a document which was valid as a
will either under the law of his domicil or under that of the donee's. In
the case of successive appointments, no doubt a will valid under the
law of either the original donor's domicil or the domicil of the person
making the appointment would suffice. 10°
The interesting question of what law governs the revocation of
a will, valid by the laws of both the donor's and the donee's domicil,
and executing a power of appointment, has arisen in England. Since
the power can be exercised, at least in England, by a will valid by either
law, it would seem that a revocation valid by either law should be effective because the donee must have intended it to be. The court so con-

25 Ch. D. 373 (1883); Hummel v. Hummel [1898] I Ch. 642. See DicEy, op. cit.
m.pra note 36, Rule s9g. But cf. Note (igoo) 1o9 L. T. 339. Of course, a will invalid

by the law of the donor's and the donee's domicil is ineffective as an exercise of the
power although valid by the law of the donee's long-time residence. Re Daly's Settlement, 25 Beav. 456 (Rolls Ct. 1858).
97. Blount v. Walker, 134 U. S. 607 (i889), aff'g, 28 S. C. 545, 6 S. E. 588 (i888).
But see Adger v. Kirk, 116 S. C. 298, Io8 S. E. 97 (192). See Note (1925) 38 HARv.
L. Ray. 661. Dicta to the same effect may be found in the following cases: Pearce v.
Lederer, 262 Fed. 993, 998 (E. D. Pa. rgig) ; Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Ms. 252, 27o, 63
Ati. 566, 568 (i9o6).
98. Betts v. Betts, 4 Abb. N. C. 317 (N. Y. 1896) ; Ward v. Stanard, 82 App. Div.
386, 81 N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (2d Dep't, 1903) ; Adger v. Kirk, 116 S. C. 298, io8 S. E. 97
(1921). See Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131, 134 (1882); RESTATEMENT, CONFUCT
o LAWS § 287; 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 287.1; GOODRIcr, op. cit. supra note 13,
§§ 171-73; 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 7; Note (19o6) ig HARv. L. REy. 122. The
same result has been reached with the aid of statutes: Olivet v. Whitworth, 82 Md. 258,
33 Atl. 723 (1896) ; Matter of Marsland's Estate, 142 Misc. 239, 254 N. Y. Supp. 293
(i931). Cf. White v. Holly, 8o Conn. 438, 68 Atl. 997 (19o8).
99. Tatnall v. Hankey, 2 Moore P. C. C. 342 (1838) ; In the Goods of Alexander,
8 W. R. 451 (186o) ; In the Goods of Hallyburton, L. R. I P. & D. 89 (1866) ; In the
Goods of Huber [1896] P. 209; In re Merlin [1898] W. N. 56; In the Goods of Trefond [1899] P. 247; it re Baker's Settlement Trusts [1908] W. N. 161; Murphy v.
Deichler [1909] A. C. 446, (191o) 23 HAzv. L. Ray. 222; In re Anziani [193o] I Ch.
407 semble; Murray v. Champernowne [19Ol] 2 Ir. R. 232. See McMurtry v. State,
III Conn. 594, 6o3, 151 At. 252, 255 (193o); Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131, 135
(1882); Hogarth-Swann v. Weed, 274 Mass. 125, 126, 174 N. E. 314, 315 (93)
semble; D'Huart v. Harkness, 34 Beav. 324, 328 (Rolls. Ct. 1865) ; In re Wilkinson's
Settlement [1917] I Ch. 62o, 627. See also RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 287;
2 BEALE op. cit. supra note 7, § 287.1 ; DICEY, op. cit. supra note 36, Rule 199; Notes
(igoo) iog L. T. 3o9, (ig1) 24 HARv. L. Ray. 654. But see Crookenden v. Fuller, 1
Sw. & Tr. 44r (859).
The remarks made by the court in that case are corrected in
accordance with the law as above stated in In the Goods of Alexander, supra. See Note
(1go6) r9 HARv. L. Rav. 122.
IOO. Cf. cases cited supra notes 31, 32.
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cluded, holding invalid a will which had been revoked properly according to the law of Italy, the donee's domicil, although such revocation
would not have been effective according to the law of England, the
donor's domicil. The will had been valid by the laws both of England and of Italy. 1°0
As to the so-called "essential validity" of the exercise of a power,
it would seem that the donor's meaning must have been the same as
in the case of its formal validity. Probably, therefore, he meant a will
which was valid by the law of either his or the donee's domicil insofar
as matters such as capacity, undue influence and the like are concerned.
It has been shown that the question of restrictions on capacity should
be determined by different considerations. As to capacity, it has been
held that, if the donee is capable by the law of his domicil to make
a will, and if the donor stipulated that a will valid by such law would
suffice as an exercise of the power, such a will is a valid exercise of the
power although by the law of the donor's domicil the donee would have
been incapable of writing a will.10 2 The same rule should apply in the
absence of such a stipulation, which ought to be inferred in any event.
Conversely, a will has been held valid where the donee was capable according to the law of the donor's domicil, although not according to
the law of the donee's domicil ;103 the same rule has been applied in the
case of undue influence.' 0 4 The authorities are not unanimous, however, and there is some indication that the law of the donor always governs any such matter.70 5
Another question of so-called "essential validity" arises when the
exercise of powers of appointment may violate the rules against perpetuities, restraints on alienation, gifts to indefinite charities, and the
like. It has been pointed out that these are problems of administration,
of concern only to the state where the property is to be held or the trust
administered, as distinguished from problems of validity. Therefore,
they should be governed by the law in force at the "seat" of the trust.
This is usually the domicil of the donor in testamentary trusts; while
in trusts inter vivos its determination depends on many factors, such
as the intention of the parties, the place of business or the domicil of
i1. Velasco v. Coney [1934] P. X43, criticized in (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. R. 279.
The criticism is in part based on the erroneous statement that the power could be exercised only by a will complying with English law. The case is approved in Note (1935)
48 HARv. L. Rzv. I202, 1241.
o2. In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts [IgI8] 2 Ch. 391.
103. See supra note 40. See especially Matter of the Will of Stewart, ii Paige 398
(N. Y. 1845).
iO4. In re Harriman's Estate, 217 App. Div. 733, 216 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1926).
io5. In re Harriman'sEstate was decided on this ground. See also MINOR, loc. cit.
supra note 7.
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the trustee or the situs of the property.1 06 The problem is complicated
in connection with personalty by the fact that the donor may have set
up a trust in one jurisdiction, and the donee may appoint the property
to trustees in another jurisdiction. In any event, no such rule is applied in cases dealing with powers of appointment.10 7 Where real estate is concerned, the law of the situs 108 governs such matters (except
possibly where the trustees have after the creation of the trust invested
in real estate in another jurisdiction) 109 regardless of the "seat" of the
trust. As to personal property the law of the domicil of the donor,,"0
not the law of the donee's domicil,"-' is generally held to govern.
Usually, the court did not even consider where the "seat" of the donor's
trust (let alone that of the donee's) would be, and sometimes no trust
is involved. The few cases do not show that the courts are astute to
uphold such trusts.
Assuming, however, that the will of the donee is in proper form
and violates no requirement of the law of either the donee's or the
donor's domicil, a further question remains. The property was, in
accordance with the will of the donor, to go to whomever the donee
should by will "appoint". To meet this requirement of the donor's will,
an intentional act of the donee is necessary. Ie must make a will disposing of the property subject to the power. Very frequently, there is
a dispute on the grave question of law as to whether a particular
will is an exercise of a power of appointment, and the courts and
legislatures have laid down, in the different jurisdictions, varying rules
of construction for ascertaining the donee's intentions. This being
io6. See Beale, supranote 27, at 972; Cavers, supra note 27, at 163, and authorities
there cited; Swabenland, loc. cit. supra note 27. Cf. Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 271 N. Y. 6o2, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205, 472 (1936) (allocation of stock
dividends between principal and income governed by laws of donor's domicil, where
trustee resided).
107. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 186 Atl. 903 (Del. Ch. 1936).
But see Note (937) 5o HARv. L. REv. 1119, 1156.
io8. See cases cited supra notes 55, 56, 6i.
lO9. See cases cited supra note 74.
I1O. As to the meaning of this phrase, see supra note 27.
iii. Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) (also
holding that, where there is an appointment to a charitable corporation, the law of that
corporation's domicil governs its capacity to take the property) ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81
Conn. 34, 70 Atl. 33 (1908) semble; Ligget v. Fidelity & Col. Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387,
I18 S. W. (2d) 72o (1938) ; Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889) sentble;
In re Burling's Estate, 148 Misc. 835, 266 N. Y. Supp. 482 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; McCreary's Estate, 328 Pa. 513, 196 Atl. 25 (1938) ; Miller v. Douglas, 192 Wis. 486, 213
N. W. 320 (1927). See MINOR, loc. cit. supra note 7; 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note
7. Cf. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920) semble; It re Kelley's Will, 161 Misc. 255, 291 N. Y. Supp. 86o (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Wilmington Trust Co.
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 186 Atl. 903 (Del. Ch. 1936); Bible Soc. v. Pendleton, 7 W.
Va. 79 (1873). But cf. Radford v. Fidelity & Col. Trust Co., 185 Ky. 453, 215 S. W.
285 (1919) (holding a trust inter vivos governed by the law of the donee's domicil) ;
Maynard v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 238 N. Y. 592, 144 N. E. 9o5 (1924). In most
of these cases the "seat" of the donor's trust, and the place of its administration, had
they been considered, would probably have been found to be the donor's domicil.
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a pure question of construction of the donee's and not of the donor's
will,1 12 the law of the "donee's domicil should be controlling. 1 3 But the

rule is settled to the contrary as to what law determines, by applying
its rule of construction, whether a general bequest or devise is an exercise of a power. If it is an exercise by the law of the donor's domicil
but is not by the law of the donee's domicil, it is held that the power
is exercised. 114 Conversely, if it is not an exercise by the law of the
donor's domicil, but is by the law of the donee's domicil, it is held that
the power is not exercised. 1 5 The same rule is applied to determine
x12. It has been suggested that statutes at the donor's domicil, providing that a
general bequest shall be construed to be an exercise of a power of appointment, changed
the meaning of the word "appoint" in the donor's will so as to include a will containing
merely a general bequest, and that they should, therefore, be applied in such cases. In
re Lewal's Settlement Trusts [1918] 2 Ch. 391; 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 287.1;
cf. 2 WHARTON, oc. cit. supra note 7. This theory would seem to be untenable, since
the appointment requires an affirmative intention of the donee and to determine whether
the donee had such intention, the law of or the usage at his domicil should apply. See
Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y. 6o2, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205,472
(1936). In Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882), it is suggested that the donee
intended the law of the donor's domicil (the only place where the will could be operative
as an execution of the power) to govern this matter. It seems obvious, however, that,
if the donee had considered the matter in such detail, he would have mentioned the
power in his Will.
113. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 171-73; MINOR, loc. cit. supra note 7;
STORY, loc. cit. mtpra note 69; 2 WHaARTON, loc. cit. supra note 7; Note (1906) 19 HARv
L. REv. 122; (1897) IO HARv. L. REv. 310. Cf. Matter of Thompson's Estate, 245
N. Y. 565, 157 N. E. 859 (1927) and discussion thereof, .spra note 42. The untenable
suggestion is made in Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. Rav. 661, that the donee did not intend
to and, hence, did not "appoint" the property by a general bequest or devise unless the
law of the donee's domicil so provides; and that, even if it does so provide, such an
appointment is not a valid exercise since it is not authorized by the donor's will unless
the law of the donor's domicil also has a similar provision.
114. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. ist, 1934);
Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 5s (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Sewall v. Wilmer,
132 Mass. 131 (1882) ; Tudor v. Vail, 195 Mass. i8, 8o N. E. 590 (907) ; Russell v.
Joys, 227 Mass. 263, i16 N. E. 549 (1917) seinble; Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
123 N. J. Eq. 245, 197 AtI. 249 (Ch. 1938) ; In re New York Life Ins. & Trust Co.,
2o9 N. Y. 585, 1O3 N. E. 315 (1913) ; Matter of Burling, 148 Misc. 835, 266 N. Y.
Supp. 482 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y.

602, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205, 472 (1936) ; Hollister v. Hollister, 85 Ore. 316, 166 Pac.

940 (1917) ; Aubert's Appeal, io9 Pa. 447, 1 Atl. 336 (1885); Norris' Estate, 9 Pa. D.
& C. 101 (1927) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Dunnell, 34 R. 1. 394, 83 Atl.

858 (1912) ; In re Baker's Settlement Trusts [i9o8] W. N. 16I; In re Strong, 95 L. J.
Ch. 22 (1925), 69 SoL. J. 693; Murray v. Champernowne [1901] 2 Ir. R. 232; Re Wilkinson [1934] i D. L. R. 544 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1933), 48 HARv. L. REv. 1202, 1241. See
RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 288; BEALF., op. cit. supra note 7, §§ I 8E.2, 288.1;
DIcEy, op. cit. mipra note 36, Rule 201. Cf. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust
Co., x86 AtI. 903 (Del. Ch. 1936) (trustee's change of domicil to foreign jurisdiction
immaterial). Contra: In re D'Este's Settlement Trusts [1903] 1 Ch. 898; In re Scholefield [19O5] 2 Ch. 408, Note (905) ig HARV. L. REv. 122.
115. Lane v. Lane, 4 Pen. 368, 55 Atl. 184 (Del. 19o3) ; Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Prindle, 29o Mass. 577, 195 N. E. 793 (1935); Ackerman v. Ackerman,
8i N. J. Eq. 437, 86 AtI. 542 (Ch. 1913) semble; Faruum v. Pennsylvania Co., 87 N. J.
Eq. 652, ioi Atl. 1053 (1917) ; In re Campbell's Estate, 138 Misc. 8oo, 248 N. Y. Supp.
344 (i93o) ; Chase Nat. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y. 602, 659, 3 N.
E. (2d) 205, 472 (1936) ; it re Kelley's Will, 161 Misc. 255, 291 N. Y. Supp. 86o (Surr.
Ct. 1936) ; Bingham's Appeal, 64 Pa. 345 (1870) ; Cotting v. DeSartiges, 17 R. I. 668,
24 AtI. 530 (1892).
See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 288; 2 BEALE, op. cit.
supranote 7, § 288.1. Contra: Re Ross Marriage Settlement, I6 Ont. W. R. 327 (910).
Cf. it re Harman [1894] 3 Ch. 607. See DIcEY, op. cit. szpra note 36, Rule 201.
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whether or not the donee intended to give his appointees a fee in the
property,11 6 and similar questions."" There should be no difference
in the case of successive appointments; under the foregoing doctrine
the law of the original donor's domicil should be applied to determine
whether a general bequest constituted an exercise of the second power
as well as of the first."

8

There is practically no authority on the question of what law
governs the exercise of the power of appointment by deed. Such an
exercise is governed by the law of the situs as to real estate. 119 As to
personal property the law of the donor's domicil should govern 120 on
the analogy to the exercise of the power of appointment by will. Since
the property is still the donor's, though the power is exercised by deed,
and since it still is in effect a testamentary disposition of property of
and by the donor, it seems proper to apply the law of his domicil in the
case of a power created by will. In the case of a power created inter
vivos, the same rule should apply, so that the law governing the trust 121
would also govern the exercise of the power.
It may therefore be concluded that, where property is subject to a
power of appointment, the situs alone has jurisdiction over and can
constitutionally levy an inheritance tax on the transfer of real estate
and tangible personal property by the exercise of the power. On the
other hand, the donor's domicil (meaning the law governing the creation of the trust in the case of a power created inter vivos) alone can so
tax intangibles, a number of states having jurisdiction over such property. The laws of the situs (as to real estate) and of the donor's
domicil, respectively, govern the creation of the power by will.' 2 2

As

116. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Whiteing, 136 Misc. 416, 241 N. Y. Supp.
398 (Sup. Ct. 193o). But cf. Radford v. Fidelity & Col. Trust Co., 185 Ky. 453, 215
S. W. 285 (1919) (holding a trust inter vivos governed by the law of the donee's domicil). See MINOR, loc. cit. sipra note 7.
I17. Matter of Masland's Estate, 140 Misc. 230, 254 N. Y. Supp. 293 (Surr. Ct.
1931) ; Barret v. Berea College, 48 R. I. 258, 137 Atl. 145 (1927) ; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N. E. 793 (1935). But cf. Maynard
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 208 App. Div. 112, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 83 (Ist Dep't, 1924).
I18. Cf. Matter of Bradford, 159 Misc. 382, 288 N. Y. Supp. 153 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
But see Bandy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N. E. 337 (1926).
119. Topham v. Portland, i DeG. J. & S. 517 (Ch. 1863); It re Hernando, 27 Ch.
D. 284 (1884). Cf. In re Anziani [193o] i Ch. 407. See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicr oF
LAWS § 235.

12o. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 267 N. Y. 1, 195 N. E. 529 (935).
Cf. Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N. Y. Supp. 573 (Sup. Ct. 19o8) ; Chase Nat. Bank v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 271 N. Y. 602, 659, 3 N. E. (2d) 205, 472 (1936) ; In re
Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 (1884) ; In re Anziani [193o] i Ch. 407. But see RESTATEMENT, CoN1_IcT OF LAws § 286 (law of situs governs as to chattels).
121. See supra note 27.
122. See general statements to the effect that the laws of the donor's domicil govern
powers of appointment: Pearce v. Lederer, 262 Fed. 993 (E. D. Pa. 1919) ; WhitlockRose v. McCaughn, 21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927); McMurtry v. State, iii Conn.
594, 151 Atl. 252 (193o) ; Prince de Beam v. Winans, iii Md. 434, 74 Atl. 626 (1gog) ;
Hogarth-Swann v. Weed, 274 Mass. 125, 174 N. E. 314 (193i); Farnum v. Pennsyl-
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to its exercise by will, a power is validly exercised if the instrument
exercising it is valid under the law of either the donor's domicile (in
the case of realty and tangibles, the situs) or the donee's, unless it has
been revoked in accordance with either of these laws. But the situs or
the donor's domicil alone can restrict the capacity of the donee or give
any rights in the property to the donee's forced heirs or creditors. It
seems that questions of the rule against perpetuities and the like are
also governed by the law of the situs or the donor's domicil alone. The
rule has become settled, illogical though it may be, that the law of the
situs or the donor's domicil likewise governs the construction of the
donee's will and determines whether the power has, in fact, been exercised.
There has been much criticism in recent years of the practice of
laying down definite rules in the field of conflict of laws. 123 It has been
suggested, in effect, that problems in this field should not be capable of
decision before they reach the highest court, and that at that time the
judges should consider all the facts involved, and, having concluded
from the "demands of justice" 124 which side should win the case,
should decide the conflicts question in such a way that that side prevails. The difficulties of administration of such a "rule" render it of
doubtful appeal to judges. Moreover, should this "rule" be adopted,
the practising lawyer will simply have to confess to clients who consult
him as to the preparation of documents that what is the governing,
law will depend entirely on which side of their beds the judges (perhaps
yet unborn) of an undeterminable court will get out of on the morning
(many years later) when they decide the case involving the document
(in the light of subsequent and unforeseeable events).125 It is not expected that this article will produce settled and definite rules for the decision of cases involving the conflict of laws and powers of appointment,
but at least it will enable practitioners to consider the relevant authorities and to present them to the courts. If it should be of any use along
these lines, it will have served its purpose. "It is something to dot an
26
'i' in perpetuity.'
vania Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 652, ioi Atl. 1053 (1917) ; Seward v. Kaufman, iig N. J. Eq.
44, ISo Ati. 857 (Ch. 1935) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 121 N. J. Eq. 497,
191 At. 813 (1937), modified, 123 N. J. Eq. 556, i99 Atl. 379 (1938); Matter of Barnhart, 137 Misc. 518, 244 N. Y. Supp. 130 (Surr. Ct. 1930) ; Barret v. Berea College,
48 R. I. 258, 137 Atl. 145 (1927) ; Note (1927) 12 Coier. L. Q. 379.
123. See, e. g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (0933) 47 HARV.
L. REv. 173, and authorities there cited.
124. Id. at 187 (quoting with approval from Professor Lorenzen). Cf. Note (1937)
47 YALE L. J. 282, 285.
125. "Persons who write wills must know whereof they speak." Opperman's Estate, 319 Pa. 455, 462, 179 Atl. 729, 733 (935).
126. Mildew, L. J., in Rex v. Badger, quoted by the Lord Chancellor in Chicken v.
Ham, I HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW (1927) 109, 110.

